ministerial ruminations about the future of the NHS. In the past it has usually been dismissed as tempting but politically naive and constitutionally irregular. Now, however, its time may have come. In 1992 the NHS Management Executive is to move to new headquarters in Leeds. The move will give even more visibility to its increasingly independent role and force into the open a debate that has already begun within the Department ofHealth: a debate about the respective roles of the executive and the department. If the management executive is the body responsible for running the NHS-a sort of protocorporation, albeit at present still embedded in central government -what is the department's future?
Leadership for the NHS
The origins of the management executive, as of so much else in the NHS today, go back to the 1983 Griffiths report,2 which recommended the creation of two new boards. The first, to be chaired by the secretary of state, was to be the Health Services Supervisory Board, responsible for determining the "purpose, objectives and direction" of policy. The second, to be chaired by an outsider with managerial skill, was to be the NHS Management Board, whose role it would be to implement policy, to give leadership to the management of the NHS, to control performance, and "to achieve consistency and drive over the long term." In his report Sir Roy Griffiths explicitly recognised that this was an alternative way of achieving many of the objectives sought by the advocates of an independent corporation but without calling into question the secretary of state's constitutional position or requiring time consuming legislation to implement the change. The appointment of a general manager for the NHS to act as the secretary of state's "right hand man" would leave undisturbed the secretary of state's "clear responsibility for overall policy direction and for the handling of the public and political sensitivities of the service."
It was a tactful formulation. But The membership of the board," in particular, seemed to ratify the shift of power in the health policy arena symbolised by the way in which the review had been produced. The policy board consists of the secretary of state and his ministerial colleagues, Sir Roy Griffiths, the permanent secretary, the NHS chief executive, two regional chairmen, and three industrialists. There are also two medical members-the chief medical officer and Professor Cyril Chantler-both of whom, however, serve in their personal capacity. There is, therefore, no ex officio medical voice. The membership of the executive, however, did not seem to mark any major change. The chief executive, Mr Duncan Nichol a former regional manager, had previously served on the management board. The other members are three civil servants, two outside experts (on finance and estates management), a director of nursing, and a medical director drawn from the department's own ranks. The executive represents, as yet, not a new administrative machinery but a new way of orchestrating the existing corps of civil servants and a new channel of influence leading directly to the secretary of state. It is an embryo within the body of the department, whose capacity to live an independent existence has yet to be tested.
But the review also gave the management executive a new mission, with the result that it has achieved a higher profile than its predecessor. It is the executive that is responsible for implementing the various policy innovations, ranging from the creation of hospital trusts to practice budgets. It is the executive that set the timetable and that is the driving force behind the changes: a reminder that it was invented in part at least because of the feeling that, though traditional civil servants might be highly skilled in putting policy options before ministers, they were not equipped for managing and implementing change. There has been a subtle shift of style, with the chief executive taking a more assertive, positive public stance: witness his leading role during the ambulance dispute. The function of the management executive is increasingly presented as being not merely to execute policies decided by others but to shape the future NHS. Introducing the management executive's goals to the NHS hierarchy earlier this year, Duncan Nichol wrote: "What I have sought to establish is that the Management Executive is more than simply the management 'delivery' arm of the NHS. As you are, so are we in the business of health, concerned to identify and tackle the major health care challenges facing the NHS."'2 There has been a shift from implementing managerial policies to implementing health policies, from a preoccupation with structure to a concern with content.
Most important of all, perhaps, the management executive is sustained by changes in the Whitehall environment. In 1988 the Prime Minister's efficiency unit published a revolutionary manifesto. Entitled The Next Steps,'3 it recommended "fundamental changes" in the Whitehall machinery: "The aim should be to establish a quite different way of conducting the business of government." The function of central government departments should be limited, as far as possible, to devising the framework of policy and monitoring performance. The executive functions of government should be transferred to agencies with maximum freedom to determine how centrally determined objectives should be met: "The presumption must be that, provided management is operating within the strategic direction set by Ministers, it must be left as free as possible to manage within that framework." In effect, the philosophy of the 1983 Griffiths report was to be generalised to the whole of government. The Department of Social Security has already divested itself of managerial responsibility for BMJ VOLUME 301 the running of its local offices, setting up a new agency to carry out this task. And the NHS Management Executive, from being a somewhat one off experiment, has become the flagship of what may turn out to be a revolution in government. Not the least reason for its success in asserting its identity so strongly is that the Prime Minister expects a regular report on its progress: it enjoys the protection of Number 10 and is seen as something of a test case.
In some respects, then, the future of the Department of Health and of the NHS Management Executive depends on the political environment. In part it will reflect the influence of the political actors involved. At present, the Prime Minister, secretary of state, and chief executive are all concerned to promote the role of the management executive: an alliance that diminishes the ability of senior civil servants to influence events, whatever their private misgivings. If there was any change of actors, there might also be a change of course. In part, however, the future of the department and the executive will depend on whether, independent of the personalities concerned, there will continue to be a trend towards restricting the role and size ofWhitehall and extending that of agencies. Although The Next Steps manifesto is very much associated with the Thatcher regime-and derives its force from the Prime Minister's strong personal support-many of its arguments echo those of the 1968 Fulton committee'4 set up by a Labour prime minister. It was this committee that argued for "hiving off' activities, including those in social fields, to autonomous public boards. It would therefore be a mistake to assume that any change of political direction would necessarily reverse the trend set by The Next Steps. The revolution in the "business of government" is less the child of political ideology than the product of information technology, which allows activity at the periphery to be monitored by the centre without any hands on interference.
NHS: Who will call the shots ? Achieving such a regular two way movement ofpeople, however, may be difficult: how, for example, will ambitious civil service high flyers be reassured that Leeds is not a place of exile, where reputations made in Whitehall die a long, slow death through oblivion? In short, although the minimal change scenario may be attractive in that it seems to entail no fundamental change in the relation between the department and the executive, it may be difficult to manage and could turn out to be only a temporary expedient if the Leeds outpost were to develop its own sense of corporate identity.
In any case, even a minimal change scenario would require decisions about who goes where-that is, the division of the existing corps of civil servants. At present it is largely possible to fudge this issue, given that everyone is in London. Moreover, the complex and contentious legislation that followed the 1989 review gave prominence to one of the traditional civil service roles, which is precisely to prepare for legislation and to assist ministers in getting bills through parliament. Now that it is possible to contemplate (perhaps overoptimistically) a longish period without green or white papers, new regulations or contracts, let alone major bills, it is also possible to contemplate radically shrinking the number of civil servants. As the Fulton committee pointed out, the appropriate model might be that of Sweden: "In Sweden central departments deal in the main with policy-making: they are quite small and are predominantly staffed by younger men." But if this model were to be followed this would imply a departmental staff counted in hundreds where it is now counted in thousands-concentrating perhaps on the management of the Whitehall environment (and BMJ VOLUME 301 8 SEPTEMBER 1990 Top Given all these highly contentious issues, it may well be that the NHS Management Executive's move to Leeds will represent a halfway house solution: that there will be no dramatic or explicit change of status but rather a slow slide into a different relationship with the Department of Health. Even so, it is clear that there are issues which require public debate. If the role of the Department of Health is to change then this has implications which go well beyond Whitehall. It will mean that professional negotiating routines forged over the past 40 years or so have to be rethought; it should prompt questions about the link between policy and professional advice; it must provoke argument about how best to ensure the sensitivity of the NHS to the needs of the population and how to improve on the present machinery of accountability.
